health

github.com/tw93/claude-health
Verdict: Generally safe
0 critical1 high1 medium
B
SCORE 75 / 100
$skillox install healthSoon
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Why grade B?

score · 75 / 100

The current grade reflects 1 high-severity finding (any HIGH → B).

0 CRIT1 HIGH1 MED0 LOW
To reach a higher grade
  • A
    Reach Atarget score 95

    Resolve all 1 HIGH.

Thresholds are documented at /docs/grading. Source-of-truth is the grade() function in @skillox/scanner.

Latest scan findings

Scan crawl-iet0xkbf10pbqkg43zcno4e9 · Thu, 28 May 2026 17:03:25 GMT · 5ms

high
Dangerous shell pattern: curl | shell
The skill contains a shell command pattern (`curl | shell`) commonly used in destructive or supply-chain attacks.
rule: dangerous-shellline: 93CWE-78
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91Run these on every audit, regardless of tier. They are the floor, not the ceiling.
92
93**Deny-list floor.** Apply this only when the project or runtime exposes agent permission settings, hook settings, MCP settings, allowed/denied tools, or a documented autonomous-agent launcher. In that case, the settings should deny, at minimum: credential and key directories (SSH, cloud providers, GPG, gh CLI), secret files (`.env`, `credentials*`, `secrets*`), pipe-to-shell installers (`curl ... | bash`, `wget ... | sh`), and outbound shells (`ssh`, `scp`, `nc`). Report this as one concise WARN with the missing categories and suggested fix; let the reviewer fill in exact local paths from the environment. If no agent settings surface exists, report the deny-list as not applicable rather than a failure.← curl | shell — common in destructive or supply-chain attacks
94
95**Environment override surface.** Treat the following as attack surface, report when set in tracked files or shipped settings without a justification comment: API base-URL overrides (redirect all traffic to a third party), auto-trust flags for project-local MCP servers, wildcard tool allowlists (`allowedTools: ["*"]`), and permission-skip flags (`--dangerously-skip-permissions` or equivalents). Print file:line and the key name only; never print secrets.
med
No capability manifest declared
The skill ships without a `manifest.yaml` or `capabilities` block in its frontmatter. Without a manifest, the runtime cannot enforce what this skill is permitted to do.
rule: no-manifest
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View latest scan →
skillox.io/c/health