worktree-agents

github.com/clawhub.ai/worktree-agents
Verdict: Do not install
2 critical0 high2 medium
F
SCORE 0 / 100
$skillox install worktree-agentsSoon
Sign in to followFollowing emails you when a re-scan drops the grade. Opt-out is per-creator on /account/billing.

Why grade F?

score · 0 / 100

The current grade reflects 2 critical findings (any 2+ CRITs → F).

2 CRIT0 HIGH2 MED0 LOW
To reach a higher grade
  • D
    Reach Dtarget score 30

    Resolve 1 of your 2 CRIT findings — any single CRIT still keeps you at D.

  • C
    Reach Ctarget score 55

    Resolve all 2 CRIT findings.

  • B
    Reach Btarget score 75

    Resolve all 2 CRIT.

  • A
    Reach Atarget score 95

    Resolve all 2 CRIT.

Thresholds are documented at /docs/grading. Source-of-truth is the grade() function in @skillox/scanner.

Latest scan findings

Scan crawl-dyvbbg5ssexpsev9esg8w8x1 · Thu, 28 May 2026 16:38:09 GMT · 1ms

crit
Skill references secret env var $GH_TOKEN
The skill instructions reference `$GH_TOKEN`, which contains a credential. If an attacker can lure the agent into including this in an outbound URL or message, the credential leaks.
rule: env-var-harvestingline: 80CWE-200
▾
78```bash
79curl -s -X PUT \
80 -H "Authorization: Bearer $GH_TOKEN" \← references $GH_TOKEN — potential credential leak
81 -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
82 "https://api.github.com/repos/<owner/repo>/pulls/<pr_number>/merge" \
crit
Hardcoded secret detected: Anthropic / OpenAI API key (sk-…)
The skill body contains what looks like a literal `Anthropic / OpenAI API key (sk-…)`. Secrets must be read from the environment, never embedded in a published skill — embedded keys leak the moment the skill is mirrored or indexed.
rule: hardcoded-secretsline: 112CWE-798
▾
110
111```bash
112export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-5Ds6eFbTEE1zu5fQ14F4FfB5892b419dB1BfC7292147B9Ef"← Anthropic / OpenAI API key (sk-…) — must be env-sourced, never inline
113export OPENAI_BASE_URL="http://152.53.52.170:3003/v1"
114CODEX_BIN="$HOME/.npm-global/bin/codex"
med
Arbitrary subprocess execution detected
The skill spawns subprocesses. Without a capability manifest declaring this, the skill could execute arbitrary commands.
rule: subprocess-executionline: 38CWE-78
▾
36### 步骤 3：并行启动 Claude Code
37
38用 exec(background=true) 并行启动多个 Agent，每个调用：← spawns a subprocess outside declared capabilities
39
40```bash
med
No capability manifest declared
The skill ships without a `manifest.yaml` or `capabilities` block in its frontmatter. Without a manifest, the runtime cannot enforce what this skill is permitted to do.
rule: no-manifest
▾
View latest scan →
skillox.io/c/worktree-agents